The European Union (EU) Directive against racial and ethnic origin discrimination has been criticized for a number of rcasons. The main ones are, firstly, that it places racial and ethnic origin at the top of the hierarchy of discrimination grounds in the EU and that it does not cover discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief; secondly, that its main aim appears to be to establish formal equality or equal treatment rather than a more substantive form of equality; and, thirdly, that it gives only limited protection to third country nationals (nationals of non-EU Member States), In this paper a number of changes to the Directive are suggested in order to make it into a more effective tool in the fight against racism and racial and ethnic origin discrimination.
INTRODUCTION

I11
June 2000, the EU adopted the Race Directive,' a Directive against discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin. It was the first legislative measure taken by the EU in the fight against racism and racial discrimination. Tn the same year, the EU also adopted a Directive against discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation2 and an Action Programme to combat di~crimination.~ These measures were all taken on the basis of Article 13 EC, which was inserted in the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 and provided the conlpetence for the EU to adopt legislation against discrimination on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. Nationality discrimination was already prohibited by Article 12 EC, while discrinlillation on the ground of sex has been prohibited in a number of Directives adopted since 1 9 7 5 .~ The main Directive against sex discrimination, the Equal Treatment Directive, was amended in 200z5 to bring it more in line with the 2000 Directivcs. 111 2004, the EU adopted a Directive to extend the protection against sex discrimination to the access to and the supply of goods and s e r~i c e s .~ Together, these Directives provide protection against discrimination on all the grounds of Article 13 EC. However, the protection against: discrimination is not the same f'or the different gounds of discrimination.
In this paper, a number of-changes, to be made to the Race Directive, are proposed in order to inalce it into a more effective tool to combat racism and racial and ethnic origin discrimination in the EU. Changes will only be suggested in relation to the Europe enact legislation against racism and racial discrimination and gives key components of such legislation. As all 25 Member States of the EU have signed and ratified the ICERD and are
Members of the Council of Europe, it appears logical to look at these instruments for guidance. Two points relating to the character of the Race Directive need to be kept in mind in this discussion: firstly, it is a EU measure, and as such it needs to conform to the principles of subsidiarity and propor-, tionality laid down in Article 5 EC. According to Recital 28 of tlie l to the other Equality Directives, altlnough many of tlne proposed changes could also be made in the same way to those other Direcl l'
tives. This is based on the opinion that all four Directives, and possible future Directives adopted on the basis of Article 13 EC,
1
should, wherever possible, contain the same definitions, provisions 11, and exceptions and unnecessary differences in wording should be 1) ' i avoided, as this would only create confusion and make interpreta-11 tion more difficult.
,l!
The first part of the paper contains an overview of the differ-,,[;; (! ences in protection provided by the different Equality Directives -,, ';l
the Equal Treatment, Race, Framework, Gender Amendment and Race Directive, the principle'of subsidiarity is adhered to, because. action by the Coiiimunity is necessary to achieve a common high level of protection against discrimination in all the Member States. The proportionality principle does require that tliis action should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve this objective.
Secondly, a Directive is, accordiiig to Article 149 EC, binding upon the Member States as to the results to be achieved, but leaves the choice of form and methods to the national authorities. Therefore, there are limits to what the EU can do.
DIFFERENCES IN LEVEL OF PROTECTION PROVIDED
Together, the Equality Directives provide protection against disci-iinination on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, rel.igion and belief, disability, age and sexual orientation, but the protection is iiot the same for the different grounds of discrimination. One of the main differences between the Directives is their inaterial scope. The Framework Directive prohibits discriininatioil on the grounds of religion 01-belief, disability, age and sexual orientation in the following areas: access to employment; access to training; einploymerit conditions; and, membership of professional organisations. The legislative protection against sex discriinination under the Equal Treatment and Gender Amendment Directives covers these same areas, but the protection was extended by the Goods and Services Directive to include the access to and the supply of goods and services. However, the Race Directive prohibits discrimiiiatioin on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin not only in all the areas covered by the above Directives, but also in the areas of social protection, which includes social security and health care, social advantages and education. The inaterial scope of the Race Directive is, thus, much wider than that of the other Directives, aiid this is one of the strong features of the Race Directive.
Another feature which lilakes the protection against racial or ethnic origin disc~imination stronger than the protection against discrimination on the grounds covered by the Franlework Directive is that the Race Directive allows for justification of direct discrimination only in very liinited and prescribed circumstances: for genuine and determining occupational requirements (Article 4) and for positive action measures (Article 5). Direct racial or etlzilic origin discri~~liilation cannot be justified under any other circumstances. With regards to sex discriiiiiiiatioii, a distiilctioil must be made between the areas covered by the Gender -Amendment Directivei.e. the eniployinent sphere -where also only very limited exceptions are allowed; and, the access to and supply of goods and services, proposed. The main, poiiits of criticism raised against the Race Directive are discussed first.
POINTS OF CRITICISM
Grounds for Discrimination
EU anti discrimination measures have been criticised for creating a hierarchy of discrimination grounds,'2 because, as already mentioned, the protectioil provided against discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin is stronger than that provided against discrimination on the other Article l 3 EC grounds. The omission of religion or belief as a discrimination ground in the Race Directive is seen as especially problematic13 because, firstly, religion is often closely related to racial and ethnic origin, so it can be difficult to distinguish between the two. Racial discrimillation The Race Directive has also been criticised for mainly aiming to establish formal. equality or equal treatment rather than a more substantive foim of equality that takes account of the disadvantages and inequalities that seine groups in society face as the results of past and on-going discrimination. And, even where it goes some way towards a more substantive notion of equality -. in prohibiting Direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another is. has been or would be treated, in a comparable situation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin.
There are, however, a number of problems with this concept. Firstly, the concept of formal equality relies on a comparator: is a person treated unequally compared to another person in the same situation? But, who is like who? The choice of a comparator can influence the outcome. Secondly, the notion that like should be treated alike, negates the value of difference and assumes sameness and, therefore, leaves no room for any recognition of the positive aspects of difference or for a requirement t l~a t people should be treated appropriately according to their differences. Thirdly, the notion of formal equality ignores any existing inequalities and social disadvantages. It does not loolc a t any imbalances that have been created by past discrimination. The fourth problem with the notion of formal equality is that it is a relative concept, that it does not guarantee a pal-ticular outcome. The law is complied with as long as two like persons are treated equally, and it does not make any difference if they are treated equally well or equally bad.1~. The concept allows for levelling-down (where both people compared are deprived of a benefit) as well as levelling-up (where the benefit is conferred on both of them).
Because formal equality is perceived as not touching the substantive inequalities that exist in most societies, or even as reinforcing these, a more substantive equality, which is sensitive to the effects of past and ongoing discrimination, is put forward. Substantive equality aims to compeilsate for the social disadvantages and inequalities suffered by certain groups. Anti discrimination measures aiming for substantive equality will allow unequal treatment of disadvantaged groups where that is necessary to achieve equality in fact. An example call be found in Article 5 of the Race Directive, entitled 'Positive Action':
With a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or l adopting specific measures to prevent or compensate for disadvan- tages linked to racial or ethnic origin.
' l
Within the concept of substantive equality two types can be distinguished: equality of opportunity and equality of results. The notion of equality of opportunity concentrates on equalising the starting point for all, on giving everyone the same opportunities. This approach may well involve unequal treatment and unequal Gn;rl-.:nrr -*---d., I --, , . .
Llllli)LLLllg
p~;~~~~, v c~a u s e i i is 11oL concerned with the end result, but only aims to make the starting point equal for all. Equality of opportunity recognises that the effects of past discrimination can make it very difficult for members of particular groups to even reach a situation of 'being alike' so that the right to like treatment becomes applicable.
The notion of equality of results aims to equalise the outcome or result. It is based on a system of justice wlich coilcentrates on correcting maldistribution and takes account of past or present discrimination. Its aim is thus redistributive.
The Race Directive does not give any indication as to what sort of positive action is allowed and how far this action can go. The case law on positive action in relation to sex discri~nination shows rlnat the ECJ sees positive action as a derogation from the principle of equal treatment and as such it should be interpreted stricl;ly.15 Under Article 2 ( 4 ) of the Equal Treatment DirectiveI6 and Article 141(4) EC which both allow for positive action measures in relation to women, the ECJ will not allow measures that give automatic preferential treatment to women at the point of selection for employment. It has also held that positive measures should be limited to the period necessary to overcoine the disadvantage.17 As Poiares Maduro writes: 'the case law of the ECJ regarding affirmative action measul-es has therefore been framed largely by the notion of equality of opportunities'.ls This has been cl-iticised for not going far enough towards remedying existing inequalities in society.
Apart from the formal and substantive notiolis of equality, there is also a pluralist approach to equality, in which the positive aspects of difference and diversity are recognised and celebrated and people are treated with equal respect and in accordance with their own req uirenlents and aspirations.
Scope
Both the material and the personal scope of the Race Directive call be found in Article 3. However, there are three problems with this Article: firstly, what is meant by the opening sentence: 'within the limits of the powers conferred upon the Community'? A similar sentence can be found in Article 13 EC and there appear to be two possible legal positio~ls on the meaning of this sentence in that AI-ticle.'%ost leading colnnlentators hold that the powers under that Article can only be used in areas which are already regulated by Cornmu~lity law or so closely attached to such areas as to make it necessary to rcgulate them. In other words, this sentence means that the power 'is subject to the lin~its of the existing Com~nunity c~r n~e t e n c i e s ' , '~ so 'the Community does not enjoy competence to regulate any discrinlination
The second view, which is the view of the Starting Line Group and Chopin and ~i e s s e n ,~~ is that Article 13 gives an autonomous power, but, in exercising that power, the Community must act in accordance with the procedural powers a t its disposal. As Article 3(1) of the Race Directive uses the same words as Article 13, there is no reason why the above discussion should not also be applicable to Article 3(1). The correct interpretation of this sentence is thus not clear and it will ultimately be up to the ECJ to clarify this.
Secondly, the Race Directive shall apply to 'all persons'. This suggests that third country nationals are also protected, which would fit in with the explicit statement in Recital 3 of the Preamble that 'the right to equality before the law and protection against discrimination for all persons constitutes a universal right'. However, Article 3(2) appears to limit the protection afforded to third country nationals against racial discrimination. It reads:
This Directive does not cover difference of treatment based on nationality and is without prejudice to provisions and conditions relating to the entry into and residence of third-country nationals and stateless persons on the territory of the Member States, and to any treatment which arises from the legal status of the third-country nationals and stateless persons concerned.
Recital 13 determines that discrimination under the Directive 'should be prohibited throughout the Community'. It then adds:
This prohibition of discrimination should also apply to nationals of third countries, but does not cover differences of treatment based on nationality and is without prejudice to provisions governing the entry and residence of third-country nationals and their access to employment and to occupation.
The Race Directive makes an exception for discrimination on grounds of nationality because this is, as mentioned, prohibited under Article l 2 EC rather than under Article 13 EC, which forms the basis for the Directive. However, there are two problems with this. Firstly, it is not always easy to distinguish discrimination on grounds of racial or P!'-nic origin from nationality discrimination. And, secondly, Article 12. does not apply to third country nationals, so they are not protected against nationality discrimination under that Article. Paragraph 2 was not present in either the original or the amended proposals for the Race Directive, but was added, together with Recital 13, after much discussion during the negotiations. Some Member States were concerned about preserving their immigration and asylum systems. The Commission argued that admission policies were not included in the matel-ial scope of the Directive, but this did not satisfy ail IvIember Stales anid in i:ic eild it was agreed that Article 3(2) and Recital 13 would be added.'3 This suggests that the Race Directive applies to non-EU natioilals and thus protects them against racial and ethnic discrimination, except in relation to immigration laws or other legal acts covering entry, residence and legal status. Thil-dly, the meaning of 'public bodies' is not clear. AI-e the activities of the police, law enforcement officials, border conti-01 officials, prison personnel and the military included under 'public bodies7? It is not completely clear if they are. Bell writes that:
. . . discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin (. . .) is forbidden in all forms of employment, whether public or private. This means that whereas the Directive does not apply to the police in terms of their administration of law enforcement, it does apply to matters such as police re~ruitrnent.'~ However, Brown2%rgues that the Directive does not expressly provide for tackling 'institutionalized racism7," but that the ECJ could either define 'disci-imination based on racial or ethnic origin' as including 'institutionalized racism7; 01-it could define 'access to and supply of goods and services which are available to the public' as catching bodies such as the police and other institution^.^^ It is, according to Bi-own, at least arguable that this phrase catches the police service. He concludes that, 'by including the police and other such bodies, a powerful message will be sent to racial and ethnic minorities that no such discrimination, regardless of the perpetrator, will be condoned.. .'. Turning this around: by not or only partially including the police and other such bodies a very negative message W-ould be sent out.
The Race Directive also mentions 'social protection' and 'social advantages'. The latter should, according to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for the Directive, be given the same iilterpretatioil as that given by the ECJ in relation to Regulation (EEC) 1618168: they are 'benefits of an economic or cultural nature which are granted within the Member States by public authorities 01-private organizations'." Perhaps some functions of the police, law enforcement officials, border control officials, the army and prison person~~el outside the employei-/employee relationship could be considered to fall under 'social protection' or 'social advantages'?
The above suggests that at least some activities of these bodies fall under the Directive: they appear to be covered in areas such as elnployment and training, but the situation is un,clear wjth regard to the exercise of their law enforcement and other duties, although these might be included under Article 3(l)(e), (f) or (h).
These are the main points of criticism directed at the Race Directive. The next part will contain suggestions for changes to the Directive to deal with the criticisms.
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Changes to the Grounds for Discrimination
As the Race Directive already provides stronger protection against discrimination on the grounds of racial and etliilic origin and levelling down is prohibited, this Directive would not need to be changed to deal with the problem of a hierarchy of discrimination grounds at EU level. The protection under the other Equality Directives could be extended to the same areas covered by the Race Directive, but discussion of this would go beyond the subject of this paper. 29 The simplest way of dealing with the problem of the omission of 'religion or belief' from the grounds covered by the Race Directive would be to add 'religion or belicf', so that the purpose of the Race Directive would be to lay down a framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin and religion or belief. T h s would alleviate both problenls mentioned above: no distinction would have to be made between these grounds and perpetrators would not be able to avoid legal action. Another solution which would deal in particular with the second problem would be to follow the amendment to Article 2. suggested by the European Parliament:
Discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin which is presented as a difference in treatment on the grounds of religion, conviction or nationality is deemed to be discrimination within the meaning of Article 1 .30 Changes in Relation to the Notions of Equality Above, we have distinguished different notions of equality. According to redm man,^' at least three functions are required of equality if it is 10 begin to coinbat racism: first, a means of redressing racist sti-ma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence; secondly, the redistributive aim of breaking the cycle of disadvantage associated with groups defined by race or ethnicity; and thirdly, the positive affirmation and accolnmodation of difference as a part of the right to equal concern and respect.
These three functions each correspolid to the notions of equality distinguished earlier: tlie first to formal equality: equal treatment wiiti~out di5erentiating op tine grouild of racii-ti or 'ethnic origin. The second function corresponds to substailtivc equality in both its forms, while the third corresponds wit11 a pluralist notion of equality.
This suggests that equality in all its types is needed to fight racism and racial discrimination. The Race Directive's prohibition of direct discrimination, of unequal treatment, perforills the first function mentioned by Fredman and, as such, it is u s e f~~l because it makes clear that behaviour in which racial prejudice finds expression will not be tolerated.
The Race Directive's title and its stated purpose (Article l ) mention the principle of equal treatment. It might be better to replace this with the 'principle of equality' for two reasons. Firstly, the priilciple of equality is, according to the case law of the ECJ, a fundamental principle of Community law. For example, in the Fi-illi v. Belgiu??~ case, the ECJ stated that equality of treatment is 'one of the fundamental principles of Community law'.32 And, in the Kul-issun casej3 the ECJ held that the fundamental rights in the Corninunity legal order 'include a general principle of equality and the obligation not to discriminate'. The general principles of Community law are binding on the Community Institutions and the primary source of guidance on which pri~~ciples are to be considered as general principles of Corninunity law is Article 6 TEU. The ECJ also uses as guidelines 'international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories'." The ECJ 'has consistently held that all sources of fundamental rights support the existence of a strong priilciplz of equality and non-di~crimination'.~~ Secondly, the principle of equality is wider than the principle of equal treatment and could include measures pcrfoming the second and third functions and thus aiming for Inore substantive or pluralist concepts of equality. The need to go beyond the prevention of unequal treatment is now recognised at the EU level, as is clear from a ~o r n i n u n i c a t i o n~~ and the Proposal for an European Year of Equal. Opportunities for ~1 1 , '~ which both came out in June 2005. These papers acknowledge that positive action Inay be necessary to coxnpensate for the structural barriers and long-standing and deep-rooted inequalities that some groups experience. They also stress the importance of social. inclusion and the 'need to develop appropriate responses to the different needs of new migrants, established minorities of immigrant origin and otller minority groupsq. j" Four problems were identified in relation to the concept of formal equality. The first one was. that it. required a comparator and that this was a ma~lipulatisie notion as the choice of comparator could iilfluei~ce the outcome. However, the words "ould be' in the indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutl-a1 provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial l or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.
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In this, the Race Directive goes beyond a notion of foimal equality , , towards a substantive equallty concept, because indirect discrimination takes accolmt of the disparate impact equal treatment can have on certain groups, or in other words, it takes account of the result of equal treatment.
In its provision for positive action in the already mentioned Article 5, the Race Directive also shows a more substantive equality concept. The Race Directive can thus be said to move towards per- The third problem with the notion of formal equality is that it #~l negates the value of difference and leaves no room for a requirement
that people should be treated appropriately according to their l '
differences. The fourth problem is chat formal equality ignores any
~
existins inequalities and social disadvantages created by past discrimination and is not interested in the outcome or result. The Race Directive deals with this in two ways: it prohibits indirect discrimination and it allow-S Member States to take positive action measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin. The Race Directive defines indirect discrimination in Article 2(2 j(b):
Ebwever, $his ixove is rather tentative in that indirect discl-imination is not always against the law, because of the possibility of justification. For example, business interests could be taken to justify a practice which indirectly discriminates against persoils from certain racial or ethnic origins. I11 this the Race Directive follows most national and international provisions against indirect discrimination wlich allow for justjfication and, therefore, the definition should not be changed. The ECJ could play a role in ensuring that Member States do not overstep the margin of appreciation given by the definition.
The move towards substantive equality made by the provision I'or positive action is also tentative, for two reasons. Firstly, Article 5 permits Member States to take positive action measures, but does not put a duty on them to do so. Secondly, there are limitations on what positive action is allowed if the ECJ follows its own case law in sex discrimination cases.
The move towards perfonning the second of Fredman's functions, could be made much stronger if the Race Directive would require Member States to take positive action like Article 2 ( 2 ) of the ICERD does. Article 5 could also move towards pedorming the third f~~nction by followi~lg paragraph 5 of the General Recommendation No. 7 of ECRI" and requiring Member States to adopt specific lncasures not only to prevent or conlpensate for disadvaatages, but also to promote the full participation of disadvantaged groups in all fields of life.
As mentioned, the Race Directive does not indicate what sort of actions are permissible under Article 5. It is suggested that this is as it should be, as it is difficult to go into details in an EU measure like a Directive. It will thus be up to the ECJ to decide what is permissible. The ECJ has limited positive action measures for women to measures that einbody an equality of opportunity concept. Will. the ECJ follow this interpretation for discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin'? On the one hand, there might be some room to allow for a broader interpretation because, firstly, the case law of the ECJ is partly based on its interpretation of Article 2(4) of the Equal Treatment Directive, but this Article 11as beein deleted by the Gender Amendment Dil-e~tive.~' Secondly, there might be some room foi-a broader interpretation in the case of racial or ethnic origin disci-imination because the scope of the Race Directive goes beyond the employment field. The ECJ might decide to allow broader positive action measures in tlle other areas covered. Support for this can be found in the Lor77r7zer.s case" iin which the ECJ upheld an employer's schelne that provided subsidised nursery places only for [emale einployees (save in exceptional circumstances). And, thirdly, as S~h i e k~~ argues, the text of the Race and Framewol-lr Directives point to a more result-oriented appi-oazli. Both Directives allow for positive measures 'with a view t o ensuring full equality in practice', which appears t o indicate that these Directives are aiming for equality of results. Schiek writes:
Neither of the directives thus uses the tern1 'equal opportunity' from the old Gender Equality Directive, which led both Advocates General Tesauro and Jacobs in their conclusions on Murschall and Knlnnlce respectively to assume that positive action measures aiming at results are inadmissible. On the contrary, aiming to 'ensure full equality in practice', the directives appear to envisage result-oriented as well as procedural measures.
O n the other hand, some authors argue that the text of Article 141(4) E C is wider than that of the Race D i r e~t i v e .~~ Waddington and Bell anticipate 'that the Court will seek to extend these general principles on positive action [from the sex discrilnination cases]. t o the other grounds of discrimination enumerated in Article 13 EC', although they d o admit that 'there remains a variety of positive action schemes that have yet t o be tested'.46 T l~e r e might thus be some scope for a broader interpretation.
An argument could also be made for allowing the Member States some discretion in deciding how far these measures should go. In the Lonzr~zers case, the E C J held that:
in determining the scope of any derogation from an individual righl such as the equal treatment or men and women laid down by the Directive [Article 2(4) Equal Treatment Directive 19763, due regard must be had to the principle of proportionality, which requires that derogations must remain withn the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the aim in view and that the principle of equal treatment be reconciled as far as possible with the requirements of the aims p~r s u e d . "~ This case law could be laid down in the Directive by adding the following sentence a t the end of Article 5: 'provided these measures remain within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order t o achieve that aim'. As Poiares ~a d u r o~~ writes:
It cannot be excluded that the I-eference in Article 141 EC to compeiisatory measures has as its ainl providing a broader marsin of discretion to Member States in adopting lneasilres of positive discrimination. The issue here for the ECJ, and the decision that it has to take regarding admissibility of affirmative action and positive discrimination measures adopted by the Member States, is not actually whether affirmative action is the best way to fight discrimillation and to reinstate equality in the labour market, but whether to give Member
States a margin of discretion to decide what is compatible with the principle of equality. . . . In my view, in an area such as this that is subject to intense discussioll and scrutiny, it ]nay be appropriate forthe court to allow for some diversity of national political choice regarding the extent to which Menlber States adopt affirmative actioil n~easures.
Allowing the Member States some discretion as to how far these measures can go, provided these measures remain within tlie linnits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve tlne ainn of ensuring full equality in practice, will allow Member States some freedom to go beyond mere measures of the equality of opportunity model and use measures of the equality of results model, but with an opportunity for scrutiny by the ECJ. This might lead t o the development of some interesting and innovative measures that could be used as examples of good practice for other Member States. I t might also help to extend the boundaries of what the ECJ will accept as permitted positive action, not only under the Race Directive, but also under the other Equality Directives.
Another change that would move the Race Directive further towards performing Fredman's second and third functions would be t o add a mainstreaming duty. The Race Directive (and the Framework Directive) could follow the Gender Amendment Directive which adds the following parapaph to Article 1 of the Equal Treatment Directive:
Member States shall actively take into account the objective of equaIity between nlen and women when formulating and implementing laws, regulations, administrative provisions, policies and activities in the areas referred to in paragraph 1.
There appears to be no reason why this duty should oiily exist in relation to gender equality and not to the other grounds of Article 13 EC. Indeed, the Draft Constitution T;or Europe extends the duty to those other g~-o u n d s ,~~ although it is 1101 sure whether the Constitution in its present form will ever come into force. It would, therefore, be better to add the duty to the Race and Framework Directives.
Changes in Relation to the Scope
The extensive material scope of the Race Directive, going beyond the enlploynlent sphere, is to be welcomed, but the meaning of 'within the limits of the powers confen-ed upon the Cornrnunity' i n both Article 13 EC and Article 3 (1) is not clear. However, it could be that the legislator meant to leave this rather vague because a more detailed description would be more restrictive. The ECJ will lliost likely follow the view of most leading coinmentators that this phrase means that the power is subject to the limits of the existing Cornlnunity competencies, as the view that it: provides the necessary powers, where these are iacking, for measures to be taken, might overstep the dividing line between the competences of the Community and those of the Member States and so infringe the pl-inciples of subsidiarity and proportionality.
. .
The personal scope of the Race Directive is, again, not very clear. The Directive appears to apply to non-EU natioilals and thus protects them against racial and ethnic origin discrimination, except in relation to immigration laws or other legal acts covering entry, residence and legal status. It is clear from the negotiations on the proposed scopejO that this is a very sensitive area as it touches on a State's sovereignty and the division of powers between the Member States and the Union. Article 3(2) appears, however, to be very broad in scope and could be used to deny third country nationals protection in a very wide range of discriminatory situations. Two possible ways of building in safeguards for the protection of third country nationals can be found in the ICERD and the Race Directive could follow either of these. Articles l(2) ICERD determines that 'this Convention shalI not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by States Parties to this Collvention between citizens and non-citizens7. The Committee on the EIimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the body that oversees the implementation of the ICERD, has brought out a General Recommendation on discrimination against non-citi~ens.'~ Point l(4) determines:
Under the Convention, differential treatment based on citizenship or i~nmigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria For suck differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of thc Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim.
Therefore, under the ICERD, differential treatment of non-citizens will be considered to be discrimination, unless it is objectively justified. A similar objective justification test could be added to Article 3 of the Race Directive. This would also cover the police, law enforcement officials, border control officials, and the army and prison personnel in all their activities, including law enforcement. They could use the exceptions of Article 3(2) as ions as that use was objectively justified. It would build in an objective test, which could be scrutinised by the courts.
The other alternative would be to follow Article l(3) ICERD, which states:
Nothing in this Convention luay be interpreted as affecting in any way thc legal provisions of State Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality.
v-
L he first aiternative wouid provide stl-onger PI-otection, but both alter~latjves would improve the protectioi~ for third country nationals and would be more in line with Recital 3 of the Prea~iible to the Race Directive. If the second alternative was followed. the suggestion of the European Parliament to add 'the exercise by ally public body, including police, immigration, criminal and civil justice authorities, of its functions'," might be useful to take away all doubt about whether these bodies and functions are covered.
Other Changes
The Framework Directive contains a duty on employers to make reasonable acconlmodation for disabled persons unless such measures would impose a disproportionate burden on them. This duty could also be useful for other grounds of d i s~r i m i n a t i o n .~~ For example, allowing for alternatives to uniforms or other clothiilg and head gear, pl-oviding a place and time for religious worship, and adapting the (work) environment and adjusting patterns of working time for elderly or disabled people could all be seen as rnalcing reasonable accommodation. It is, therefore, suggested to extend the duty in the Framework Directive beyond disability. If, as was suggested, religion or belief are added to the grounds of discrimination prohibited in the Race Directive, then the duty to make reasoiiable accommodation should also be included in that Directive. A similar Recital to Recital 21 of the Framework Directive should then also be added. This Recital suggests what should be taken into accouilt to decide whether a measure would impose a disproportionate burden: the financial and other costs entailed, the scale and fiilancial resources of tlne organization or undertaking and the possibility to obtain public funding or any other assistance. 'Health and safety' might also be mentioned.
According to the general rule of Coinmunity law, it is for the I i~atioilal law of the Member States to provide remedies to protect i rights derived from Comlnunity law and to deternline wliat sanctions should be made available. The EU can, therefore, not give very detailed provisions, because this would be contrary to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Therefore, no changes are proposed to the provisions on remedies and sai~ctiox~s. Member States are free to decide on the structure and f~~~~c t i o n i n g / of such bodies in accordance with their legal traditions and policy c l~o i c e s .~~ he negotiations on the Directive show, that providing for more extensive competenccs for these bodies was seen as overstepping 'the line between setting objectives and telling Member States how to achieve them (so colltravening the principle of s~b s i d i a r i t y ) ' .~~ Leaving the Member States some discretion as to the tasks to be given to these bodies might also lead to some interesting developments.
CONCLUSION
Changes to be made to the Race Directive have been suggested with the aim of making it into a more effective legislative measure in the fight against racism and ralcial discriminatioil in the EU. The major points of criticism specifically raised against the Race Directive were, firstly, with regards to the grounds of discrimination, that it puts racial and ethn~c ongin at the top of the hierarchy of discrimination grounds and that it omits 'religion or belief' from the protected grounds; secondly, with regards to the concept of equality that it mainly aims for a notion of formal equality and does not really go very far towards other concepts of equality; and, thirdly, that the protection it provides for third country nationals appears to be limited. As all Equality Directives contain the same non-regression clause and thus prohibit levelling-down, the Race Directive itself does not need ally changes to deal with the hierarchy as the protection against discrimination on the grounds of' racial or ethnic origin is already stronger than that against discrimination on the other Article 13 EC grounds. To deal with the hierarchy, the protection provided by the other Equality Directives could be 'levelled-up' to the same level as that provided by the Race Directive.
The suggestion to add 'religion and belief' to the grounds covered by the Race Directive responds to the second point of criticisnl mentioned in relation to the grounds of discrimination. Even if the level of protection provided by the Framework Directive would be extended to cover all areas covered by the Race Directive, 'religion or belief' should still be added to the grounds in the Race Directive, because that would avoid having to make a distinction between racial and ethnic origin on the one hand and religion or belief on the other hand. Perpetrators do, indeed, not often make such a clear distinction either.
In relation to the concept of equality, the premise was that equality in all its concepts or, in other words, equality performing all Fredman's functions, is needed to combat racism and racial discrimination. To move the Race Directive further towards substantive and pluralist coilc~pts of eqzality, the'fellowing char~ges were suggested: firstly, the title and purpose of the Directive should be to implement the principle of equality, rather than the principle of equal treatment. Secondly, the provisions for positive action should be made compulsory, like they are under the ICERD. 'I~lnirdly, positive action should be required not only to pi-event 01-conlpensate for disadvantages, but also to promote full participation of disadvantaged groups in all fields of life. Fourthly, the Member States should be given some discretion in relation to positive action measures. And, lastly, a mainstreaming duty like the one in the Gendei-Ainendxment Directive should be added to the Race Directive.
Suggestions for changes to Article 3(2) of the Race Directive have been made to ensure that the exception in this article is not used to deny third country nationals protection. The first suggestion was to add a proportionality or objective justificatioi~ test to the second paragraph, while the second one added a proviso. Both suggestions were based on the ICERD and the interpretation of that Convention as given by the CERD.
The time is ripe to suggest changes to the Race Directive, because the Coininission is currently working on its five year report on the applicatioil of the Directive undei-Article 17 and on the feasibility study on possible new measures to complemei~t the current legal framework, announced in the 2005 C o i n m~n i c a t i o n .~~ This paper is meant to contribute to the discussion on possible changes to the Race Directive. 
